Firewalls are one of the most common mechanisms used to protect the network from unauthorized access and security threats. Nowadays, time-based 
Introduction
A firewall protects the network from unauthorized access and facilitates a secure access to the outside world. The packet filtering technique in a firewall provides a basic level of security and operates on the network layer of the OSI model or at the IP layer of the TCP/IP model. It controls the network traffic using a predefined, ordered set of filters called firewall policy, FP. Every filter f has a condition and an action. The condition consists of "n" predicates and the action can be either accept or deny. Each predicate in the condition is written based on the values contained in each "n" key field of a packet header. A packet P matches a filter f if and only if the packet header satisfies all the predicates in the condition of the filter. In our research, we have adopted the first matching filtering scheme, where the priority of the filter flows from top to bottom like in IPFW in FreeBSD [27] , and the action of the first matching filter is executed.
Firewall policy management is a notoriously difficult task for any network administrator due to its dynamic and highly interactive filters. For example, while examining 37 firewalls in production enterprise networks, Wool found that all the firewalls were misconfigured and thus vulnerable [2] . Young et al have developed a new scheme which uses the characteristics of web services to block the web from DDoS Attacks [26] . Among many misconfigurations, a conflict is a misconfiguration that frequently occurs in a firewall. It occurs in an FP when a packet matches multiple filters. A conflict is a very common misconfiguration and Hamed et al. found that there is a high probability of conflicts being created even by expert system administrators due to the high interaction among filters [7] . The conflicts in the policies either bring malicious traffic into the network or block some intended network packets. Therefore, it is necessary to reconfigure the filters to discard the conflicts.
Nowadays, time-based filters are widely used to restrict the network traffic with respect to time [28] [29] [30] . They are actively used in many applications like CISCO ACLs, surf control web filters, and Linux iptables [30] . They are very handy when a service is required to be available only at certain times during the day or even certain days. For example, they can allow better QOS in the accounting department during the last three days of a month and also control certain unintended web services during business hours. A firewall policy with a time field is called time-based firewall policy, TFP. The time-field specifies the time constraint, which restricts the network traffic at specific dates and times. A packet P matches a time-based filter f if and only if the arrival time of P satisfies the time constraint of f and the values of P"s key fields satisfy all the predicates in the condition of f.
Conflict occurs in a TFP when a packet matches multiple time-based filters. Many techniques have been developed to detect conflicts in FPs [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] . We have developed an n-dimensional spatial approach, which finds the n-dimensional topological relation TR of the filters to detect conflicts in the FPs [4] . Since the techniques available detect the conflicts in firewall policies without time fields, they cannot be used for the time-based firewall policies. As a result, when they are applied to time-based firewall policies, the time-fields are ignored; therefore, the problem of obtaining false positive results occurs, stating a non-conflict as a conflict. Therefore, it is necessary to find a solution to the above problem. This problem has not been addressed in any research, even though it is very significant. To resolve this problem, we have presented the preliminary version of the extended topological-spatial analysis used to detect conflicts for TFPs in [3] . In this paper, our main contributions are as follows:
(1) We have improved the preliminary version by formalizing the conflict detection problem by designing a TFP, (2) We have presented the complete implementation of the proposed system by providing detailed functions and algorithms to deal with the time constraints, and (3) We have evaluated the proposed system using some sample TFPs and clarified its effectiveness and usefulness.
We have formalized the conflict detection problem by designing a TFP similar to the commonly used TFPs such as LINUX iptables, CISCO ACLs, and so on. Rather than analyzing the filters for infinite time duration, we have introduced a finite time duration called the conflict detection period CDP, which is predetermined by a user, so that we can analyze the TFP by considering the timeconstraints and detect the conflicts in the TFP before the packet arrives. We have also extended the topology-based spatial analysis of firewall policies without time-based filters proposed in [4] to those with time-based filters. In this extension, we simultaneously analyze the n-dimensional packet space and the time field in temporal space and compute the (n + 1)-dimensional TR of the filters to detect conflicts in the TFP. We have used BISCAL (a bit-vector based spatial calculus) [4] to extract the conflicting filters in the TFP. Further, we have developed a function called time divisor to investigate the interaction between the filters in temporal space.
We have evaluated the feasibility and usefulness of the proposed system by conducting experiments using some examples of time-based firewall policies. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: We have first described the formally designed TFP and its conflicts in section 2. In section 3, we have presented the simultaneous analysis of the n-dimensional packet space and temporal space. We discuss the bit-vector operations of filters through BISCAL in section 4. In section 5, we have presented the implementation of our system. We have shown the experimental analysis and evaluation in section 6. In section 7, we have performed a survey of the related works. In section 8, we have presented the conclusion and future work.
Time-Based Firewall Policy

Definition of TFP
We have formally designed a TFP that consists of an ordered set of 'm' filters and is expressed as follows: TFP: (f 0 , f 1 ,…,f m-1 ). Consider the time-based filters f i and f j (i, j ∈ [0, m -1], i < j), where the filter f i is placed before f j in the TFP. We adopt the first matching filtering scheme where the priority of the filter decreases from f 0 to f m -1 . Each filter f i consists of a condition and an action. The condition consists of (n + 1) predicates, (p i0 , p i1 ,…,p in ), and f i is expressed as follows:
..,p in , action, where p i0 to p in -1 are the constraints for the values of the key fields to be used in packet filtering and p in is a predicate that specifies a time constraint. The commonly used key fields are source IP addresses (represented as SrcIP), destination IP addresses (DesIP), source ports (SrcPort), destination ports (DesPort), and protocols (Pro). 
Each predicate p ik
as a ik ≤ u k < b ik , by using a uniform range value [a ik , b ik ) and the value in the k th key field of the packet header, u k . The predicate p in is the time constraint that the packet arrival time must satisfy to match the filter. It is represented as isActive(f i , T), which is defined below by using a time constraint; the time constraint which consists of a time range [ts i , te i ), a date d j , and a set of days of the week S i as well as T = (t, de, dy), where t, de, and dy are the time, date, and day of the week when a packet arrives at the firewall.
At a given time and date T, we say that a filter f i is active if isActive(f i ,T) is TRUE. We also say that a packet P satisfies the time constraint of a filter f if P arrives at the firewall when the filter f is active. Now, we define a predicate isMatched(P, T, f i ), which shows whether a packet with arrival time and date T matches a filter f i as follows.
. We represent a filter in the form called internal form, which includes the range values instead of the predicates in (n + 1) fields. Since we can use a date and days of the week alternatively in the (n + 1) th field, i.e., the time field, there are two types of forms to represent a filter as follows:
(1) Type-1: periodic filter Figure 1 shows an example TFP written in the internal form, including the 0 th field SrcIP, the 1 st field DesIP, and the time field ActTIME. In this figure, the hyphen in the sub-field DAY shows S, which implies every day. We also represent the predicates and the action by f i .pname and f i .action, respectively, where pname is a predicate name. For example, f 3. ActTIME.TIME.start = 08:00, and f 1 .action = Deny in the TFP shown in Figure 1 .
In the example given in Figure 1 , f 1 is periodic and becomes active from 12:00 to 14:00 on every Friday and f 2 is periodic and becomes active from 10:00 to 18:00 every day, whereas the default filter f 5 is always active. f 3 is non-periodic and becomes active from 8:00 to 12:00 on January 4, 2012. For example, when a packet P arrives at 08:00 on June 27, 2011, the four filters f 0 , f 2 , f 4 , and f 5 become active. A packet matches a filter f from the above filters if the filter has the values u 0 and u 1 in SrcIP and DesIP fields such that (f.
The default filter f 5 has the lowest priority, which denies access to all the packets when no other filter matches the packet.
Conflicts in TFP
A conflict occurs in a TFP when a packet matches multiple time-based filters. As shown in the above observations, we can say that we can remove a filter from the consideration of conflict detection if it is not active. Now, we define a conflict detection period CDP, which was introduced in section 1 and a live filter as follows: 
Simultaneous Analysis of Space and Time
Problem Statement and Solution
Even though many conflict detection techniques are available [4] - [19] , the prevailing techniques cannot deal with the TFPs and they have to ignore the time constraint during conflict detection. However, ignoring the time field during conflict detection generates false positive results, stating a non-conflict as a conflict. In other words, they cannot precisely detect the conflicts in the TFP defined in the previous section. To resolve this problem, this paper has proposed a conflict detection system for TFP by applying the n-dimensional spatial analysis [4] to the (n + 1)-dimensional analysis by introducing a separate temporal space to analyze the time constraints of the filter.
N-dimensional Spatial Analysis
Conflict detection through spatial analysis provides a systematic and powerful conflict classification [3] - [6] . A filter reverse search system was proposed based on the spatial analysis of the packet filters [25] . Packet classification is achieved by finding the geometric location of a packet in an n-dimensional space in the current packet classification techniques [20] - [23] . A multi-dimensional packet classification is viewed as a point location problem in computational geometry. When the number of key fields in a packet is n, the packet can be represented as a point in an n-dimensional space called the packet space. A filter is represented as a subspace of a packet space called the filter space, which includes all the points of the packet that match the filter. The filter space of a filter f i is represented as FS (f i ), which shows a set of packets satisfying the predicates p i0 to p in -1 of f i . The geometric shape of the filters in 2D is a rectangle and in an n-dimensional space, it is a hypercube or ncube. We have projected the sample TFP shown in Figure 1 in 2D where the X-axis is the SrcIP and Yaxis is the DesIP in Figure 2 . We have extracted five topological relationships between the two filters in n-dimensional packet space, which are suitable to detect conflicts for any pair of filters f i and f j . They are TR n (f i , f j ) ∈ {disjoint, inside, contains, equal, overlap}, and its 2D illustration is shown in Figure 3 . It can be generalized for higher dimensions and is determined from the filter spaces of f i and f j , i.e., FS (f i ) and FS(f j ) as follows: 
Simultaneous Analysis of n-dimensional and Temporal Space
To detect conflicts through spatial analysis for the TFP, we have introduced an (n + 1)-dimensional packet space, in which the spatial relationship between filters in terms of the time constraints as well as n-dimensional packet space can be simultaneously analyzed. When the number of key fields in a packet header is "n," the packet arrival time and date is in the (n + 1) th dimension and a packet can be viewed as a point in an (n + 1)-dimensional packet space. As we have discussed earlier, the filter space of a time-based filter is represented by a subspace of an (n + 1)-dimensional packet space, which includes all the points of the packet that match the filter, including the time constraint. The filter space of the time-based filter f i is represented as a cube in 3D and the example TFP is plotted in Figure 4 , where the range of values in the (n + 1) th dimension is given by 00:00 06/01/2012 to 24:00 06/01/2012.
For a given packet P, time and date of the packet arrival T, and filter f i , isMatched(P,T,f i ) does not become TRUE if isActive(f i ,T) is not TRUE. Then, we introduce TR n + 1 (f i , f j ) as a topological relationship between filters f i and f j in the (n + 1) th dimension by using the temporal relationship between the time periods of the filters, in which isActive(f i ,T) = TRUE and isActive(f j ,T) = TRUE, as follows: Design and Implementation of Conflict Detection System for Time-Based Firewall Policies Subana Thanasegaran, Yuichiro Tateiwa, Yoshiaki Katayama, Naohisa Takahashi A filter f i has a single time period, in which isActive(f i ,T) = TRUE, if it is non-periodic, i.e., it has a time and date in the time field, whereas it has infinite number of time periods if it is periodic, i.e., it has time and days of the week in the time field. However, for a given conflict detection period CDP, a periodic filter can be represented as a filter having a finite number of time periods. For example, for the given CDP = [01/01/2012, 31/12/2012], the temporal relationships among the filters in the TFP shown in Figure 1 are represented as shown in Figure 5 . From this Figure, we can see that TR n + 1 (f 2 , f 4 ) = contains, TR n + 1 (f 1 , f 2 ) = inside, TR n + 1 (f 0 , f 1 ) = disjoint, and so on. Now, we combine the n-dimensional topological relationships between the filters TR n and the temporal relationship between the filters TR n + 1 so that the topological relationship between two filters f i and f j in the (n + 1)-dimensional space TR n + 1 can be determined as follows:
disjoint if isActive(f i ,T) = FALSE for all T such that isActive(f j ,T) = TRUE, equal if isActive(f i ,T) = TRUE for all T such that isActive(f j ,T) = TRUE and isActive(f j ,T) = TRUE for all T such that isActive(f i ,T) = TRUE,
The filter f j is either partially or completely covered by f i , except in the disjoint relation. In the contains and equal relations, f j is completely covered by f i and thus, f i causes an error in f j . In the inside and overlap relations, the filter f i creates a warning for f j as f j is partially covered by f i . Therefore, we can say that f i and f j do not cause any conflict when they have the disjoint relation. We identify the TR n + 1 (f i , f j ) discussed above for each filter pair in the TFP by simultaneously analyzing the ndimensional packet space and the temporal space to find the conflicting filters in the TFP. Using this simultaneous approach, we can eliminate the problem of obtaining false positive results.
We have shown the projection of filters in the TFP given in Figure 1 in the (n + 1)-dimensional space or 3-dimensional space in Figure 4 , where the time field is shown as 06/01/2012 on the X-axis, DesIP on the Y-axis, and the SrcIP on the Z-axis. From this figure, we can see that
, and so on. However, in Figure 2 , we can see Design and Implementation of Conflict Detection System for Time-Based Firewall Policies Subana Thanasegaran, Yuichiro Tateiwa, Yoshiaki Katayama, Naohisa Takahashi that TR n (f 0 , f 2 ) = contains, which is a false positive result as the time field is ignored. Therefore, by determining the TR n + 1 relationship through simultaneous analysis of the n-dimensional packet space and the temporal space, we can find the actual conflicting filters in the TFP.
BISCAL
BISCAL is a bit-vector based spatial calculus used to detect the conflicts of m filters in a (n + 1)-dimensional space. It uses the bit-vector data structure and employs six primitive operators to detect the conflicts. It computes a special vector called the characterization vector, which preserves the topological status of the filters in the i th dimensional space. The overview of BISCAL is described here and the computational steps for extracting TR n + 1 are explained in the implementation section.
Data Structure: Bit-vector
If an arbitrary set of filters is selected from m filters of a TFP, it is represented by a bit-vector [b 0 …b m-1 ]. If f i is selected, then the corresponding bit b i is set to "1" and if f i is not selected, then b i is set to "0". For example, if (f 1 , f 3 ) is selected from the set of filters {f 0 , f 1 , f 2 , f 3 }, the corresponding bitvector representation is [0101] . Since the focus of this paper is on the bit-vector, we later use "vector" to refer to the bit-vector, if not otherwise specified. It includes a function called V2S, which converts a vector to a filter set that contains the filters corresponding to the bits set to "1." For example, V2S
Primitive Operators
We have introduced six primitive operators in BISCAL to compute the topological relationship between filters. 
Characterization Vectors
Characterization vectors (CV) preserve the topological status of the filters and help to eliminate unnecessary computational steps. The three CVs computed using BISCAL are coexistence vector OV, fully covered vector FV, and disjoint vector DV. The TR n + 1 is computed from the following characterization vectors. Design in DV is set to "1" when f i is disjoint. Even though, the disjoint filters do not cause any conflict, identifying DV helps in discarding the disjoint filters and avoids unnecessary computation.
Implementation of Conflict Detection System for Time-Based Firewall Policies
System Overview
The proposed system detects and classifies the conflicts in the given time-based firewall policy TFP, which consists of m filters and (n + 1) fields. It computes the (n + 1)-dimensional topological relationship of each filter pair (f i , f j ), TR n + 1 (f i , f j ) and classifies it into errors and warnings for f j according to the topological relationship. All the conflicting combinations of the filters are obtained from the CVs and classified into five types of conflicts and other results (no error and warning filters) in the next subsections.
The proposed system consists of a vertical decomposer, spatial divisors, a time divisor, SCV extractors, a CV extractor, a TR extractor, and a conflict classifier, as shown in Figure 6 . The BISCAL executes the computation of the SCV extractors, CV extractor, and TR extractor. The default filter is the least priority filter f m -1 and is not considered for conflict detection as it always conflicts with the remaining filters.
The system receives the TFP and CDP as the input and follows the procedure given below. 1) The vertical decomposer divides the TFP into (n + 1) divisions, in which each division includes the i th field of the TFP and is represented by X i (f 0 …f m -1 ). 2) For each i th field from i = 0 to n -1, the spatial divisor projects the filters on the i th axis and decomposes them in their boundaries to form intervals, and the filter sets in each interval are added to the set of filter sets for the i th field SFS i . The time divisor finds the interaction of the filters in the time field X n (f 0 …f m -1 ) and adds the results to SFS n . 3) The SCV extractors compute the SCV from the SFS i in each dimension using BISCAL. 4) The CV extractors calculate the CVs by combining the SCVs obtained in the previous step using BISCAL. 5) The TR n + 1 (f i , f j ) for all the filter pairs in the TFP are detected using BISCAL in the TR extractors. 6) The conflict classifier classifies the conflicts into errors, warnings, and no error and warning filters according to the TR n + 1 (f i , f j ) for all the filter pairs in the TFP. We explain the operations carried out in each step using the example TFP shown in Figure 1 .
In our system, we have devised techniques to find the disjoint filters at each stage of computation so that the disjoint filters can be removed in the intermediate stage of computation and the computational efficiency of the system can be improved.
Vertical Decomposer
For a given TFP and CDP, it decomposes the filters into (n + 1) divisions, where each division X i includes the i th field of the TFP denoted by X i (f 0 …f m -1 ). Each X i (f 0 …f m -1 ) includes the values in the i th field of the filters. It also bypasses the CDP to the time divisor for temporal analysis. For example, for the sample TFP in Figure 1 , the values in the SrcIP and DesIP fields are given to the corresponding 
Spatial Divisor
A spatial divisor finds the interaction between the filters, which are projected on the i th dimension, where i vary from 0 to n -1. It projects each filter f i in X i (f 0 …f m -1 ) on to the i th dimension corresponding to the range values in the i th field of the filters, i.e., the boundary values of the filters. After the projection, it decomposes the filters in their filter boundaries and forms intervals such as I 0 , I 1 , and so on as shown in Figure 7 . It also finds the filter sets that exist in each interval and adds them to the SFS i . The empty intervals are not considered for conflict detection since it is not concerned with conflict computation. The outputs of the spatial divisor corresponding to the SrcIP and DesIP fields are generated in SFS 0 and SFS 1 , respectively, where SFS 0 = {{f 0 , f 4 }, {f 0 , f 1 , f 2 }, {f 0 }, {f 3 }} and SFS 1 = {{f 0 , f 4 }, {f 0 , f 1 , f 2 }, {f 0 }, {f 3 }}.
Time Divisor
For a given CDP, the time divisor discovers the temporal relationship between the filters. It obtains the values in the ActTIME fields of the filters and finds the outputs SFS n according to the following steps.
STEP1: It adds all the periodic filters in the TFP to a set of live filters LF and selects a non-periodic filter f i from the TFP that satisfies the following predicate and adds it to LF: CDP.Start ≤ f i .ActTIME.DAY ≤ CDP.Stop.
STEP2: It maps a filter in LF onto the temporal axis, i.e., the (n + 1) th axis, according to the values in the time field of the filter, i.e., start and stop f i .ActTIME. For example, if a filter f i is active on Wednesday from 08:00 to 12:00, it is mapped from 08:00 to 12:00 on every Wednesday in the CDP. If a filter is active every day, the boundary values corresponding to all the days in the CDP are identified.
STEP3: It decomposes each filter in its boundaries, which are mapped onto the temporal axis by in STEP2, so that time intervals such as I 0 , I 1 , etc., are created similar to those in the spatial divisor.
STEP4: It obtains a set of filters from each interval created in STEP3 and makes SFS n using the filter set. STEP2 is described in detail as follows. In the FilterMapper, the function GetDay(date) translates the given date to a day of the week. ∈ FW) and (GetDay(date) ∈ f i .ActTIME.DAY)) or ((f i ∈ FD) and date = f i .ActTIME.DAY))) then { X.date = date; X.time = f i .ActTIME.TIME.start; Y.date = date; Y.time = f i .ActTIME.TIME. 
Computation by BISCAL
It computes the TR n + 1 of the filters using the following extractors: SCV extractors, CV extractors, and the TR extractor. Initially, the SCVs are computed in the SCV extractors and the CVs are computed from the SCVs. The TR n + 1 is computed from the CVs obtained using BISCAL.
SCV extractor
The SCV extractors compute the single-dimensional characterization vectors of the i th dimension. There is no variation in the computation of SCVs from SCV 0 ,…,SCV n . Hence, we explain the computational steps through the SCV i extractor that calculates the set of characterization vectors of the 
CV extractor
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TR n+1 extractor
Initially, we identify the disjoint filters, which have a disjointed topology with each and every filter in the TFP, and the TR n + 1 (f i , f j ) of the filters, which have the topology that causes conflicts in the TFP. for each filter pair in CCTP 
From the above results, we have found that f 1 is a fully covered filter. For each filter pair in the CCTP, we applied the above conditions and found that TR n + 1 (f 0 , f 4 ) = overlap, TR n + 1 (f 0 , f 2 ) = overlap, and TR n + 1 (f 1 , f 2 ) = inside.
Conflict Classifier
It classifies the conflicts into two types of errors and three types of warnings according to TR n + 1 (f i , f j ) and the action of the filters. We have been inspired by [5] , which classifies conflicts into four types, and in addition, we have introduced a new type of conflict called redundancy warning. We have defined all the types of errors and warnings as follows:
(a) Shadowing error: There exists a shadowing error between f i and f j when any of the following conditions is true. 4 . The disjoint filter f 3 and the conflict causing filter f 0 , f 1 constitute the no error and warning filters, respectively. Thus, our system can successfully detect and classify the conflicts into two types of errors, three types of warnings, and no error and warning filters.
Experimental Analysis
Experiments
We evaluate the feasibility and usefulness of the proposed system by conducting a comparative study with the following two systems.
(1) System1 (proposed system)
We have developed a prototype system using JAVA programming language, which detects conflicts in TFP by analyzing the filters in the (n + 1)-dimensional space.
The System2 is the same as the System1, except that it ignores the time fields of TFP and analyzes the filters in an n-dimensional space.
In the comparative study, we require many TFPs with various numbers of filters. Due to the unavailability of publicly used TFPs, we have synthesized two firewall policies FP (m) and TFP (m), which have m filters, as follows: (1
) FP (m)
We have synthesized a firewall policy without time fields: FP (m) by using a firewall policy of 100 filters without a time field: FP L , which has five fields: SrcIP, DesIP, SrcPort, DesPort, and Pro and is used in our laboratory, as follows: if m ≤ 100, the firewall comprises the first-m filters of the FP L , whereas if m > 100, the firewall comprises of a combination of the FP L and the new filters, which are synthesized by using a randomly selected filter from FP L .
(2) TFP (m)
We have converted the FP (m) into TFP (m) by adding the values of TIME and DAY in the ActTIME field as follows: the k th filter in TFP (m) is a combination of the k th filter of FP (m) and randomly generated values of TIME and DAY.
We have performed two different kinds of experiments to evaluate the feasibility and usefulness of the proposed system as follows:
Experiment I: We evaluated the feasibility of the proposed system by investigating the computation time of the two systems in terms of two parameters: the number of filters and the length of CDP.
Experiment II: We evaluated the usefulness of the proposed system by comparing the number of conflicts detected by the two systems and by investigating the percentage of false positive results. is represented by the Y-axis in the logarithmic scale. In this figure, we found that when the number of filters increases, the computation times of the two systems increase exponentially and the computation time of System1 is quite larger than that of System2. This is because the CDP is too long and that the periodic filters are frequently repeated in the CDP, which leads to large number of filter sets for conflict detection. As a result, the proposed system takes a long computation time to detect the conflicts in the TFPs. Therefore, it is necessary to devise a technique to deal with the periodic filters, especially for long CDPs.
2. Results of Experiment I
(1) Relationship between the length of CDP and computation time
We have analyzed the TFP (100) for various lengths of CDPs using the two systems and compared the computation times. We have used 2 k weeks as the lengths of CDP, which starts from 01/01/2011, where k varies from 0 to 6. Figure 9 shows the results of the experiments, which shows the relationship between the length of the CDP and the computation times of the two systems. We find that the computation time taken by System2 remains constant as it ignores the time constraint during conflict computation. In System1, we found that until the CDP is 16 weeks, the system requires less than 10 s to compute the conflicts, and this time increases exponentially when the CDP increases from 16 to 64 weeks. Therefore, we have found that our proposed system can be used to detect conflicts for a shorter CDP, and the conflict detection can be repeated in the near future. Further, there is no need to detect conflicts again unless and until the TFP is modified.
Results of Experiment II
We have compared the ratio of conflicts, which the two systems detected in the TFP (100). We have performed this experiment to determine the percentage of false positive results that the prevailing techniques [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] can generate during conflict detection for TFPs. We introduce a class of conflicts c, which shows an error from among {shadowing error, redundancy error, correlation warning, generalization warning, redundancy warning and no error or warning}, which have been classified in Section 5.6, and define the ratio of each class of conflicts as follows: Design and Implementation of Conflict Detection System for Time-Based Firewall Policies Subana Thanasegaran, Yuichiro Tateiwa, Yoshiaki Katayama, Naohisa Takahashi
Number of class-c conflicts detected by System1 R(c) = Number of class-c conflicts detected by System2 Figure 10 . The ratio of conflicts detected by the two systems Figure 10 shows the relationship between the class of conflicts and R. In this Figure, we find that the ratio of shadowing error is 1/16 and that of redundancy error is 1/5. We also find that the filters exhibiting generalization warning and redundancy warning also considerably reduced, as shown in Figure 10 . The increase in the correlation warning shows that the fully covered filters become partially covered in the (n + 1)-dimensional space and a large increase in the no error and warning filter shows that nearly 50% of the filters become disjoint in the temporal space. Since the workload of the administrator is directly proportional to the effort towards reconfiguration of the conflicting filters, the workload of the administrator is reduced drastically as the number of conflicting filters is reduced. Therefore, we conclude that even though the proposed system takes more computation time than System2, it can eliminate false positive results completely and thereby, help to reduce the workload of the network administrator to a reasonable level.
Related Works
Over the past few years, researches on the analysis of firewalls have received much attention . Hamed et al. proposed an algorithm to detect the conflicts caused between the filters in a firewall policy based on the relations between every two filters and the taxonomy of the different conflicts in a firewall policy [7] . Y. Yin et al. proposed a technique to detect the conflicts caused by a combination of filters by analyzing the filters in n-dimensional space [5] . Both of them do not recommend how to handle time-based firewall policies.
V. Capretta et al. proposed the formalization of conflict detection for firewalls; it defines conflicts for filters only if the actions of the filters are different [14] , but they do not provide any method to deal with time-based firewall policies. In this paper, we have explicitly classified the conflicts of the timebased filters for cases where the actions of the filters are same as well as different. Alex et al. developed a technique to compress the firewall policy by minimizing the number of filters [15] . M. Yoon et al. proposed a technique to minimize the firewall rule set in a multiple firewall environment [16] . These methods dealt with common headers like Source IP and Destination IP, but do not provide any suggestions for firewalls where a time field is included.
Mayer et al. developed a firewall analysis tool Fang to perform customized queries on a set of filters and operate on a more understandable level of abstraction [10] . Wool et al. improved the usability of Fang [11] . G. Misherghi et al. proposed a general framework for rule-based firewall optimization [17] . These tools and methods help the administrators to verify the correctness of a firewall policy manually. However, they have not analyzed the cases where time-based filters are present. K. Matsuda proposed a matrix decomposition model to analyze the filters in FPs with few compression methods [24] . In his work, for some reasons, an administrator can intentionally embed Design and Implementation of Conflict Detection System for Time-Based Firewall Policies Subana Thanasegaran, Yuichiro Tateiwa, Yoshiaki Katayama, Naohisa Takahashi redundant filters, which will conflict with the other filters in a firewall policy. However, time-based firewall policies were not considered in his model. H. G. Verizon et al. proposed a fast and scalable method for resolving the anomalies in firewall policies [18] , which can be useful for large-scale firewall policies. H. Hu et al. proposed a firewall anomaly management and resolution environment: FAME, and developed a grid-based visualization of the firewall policy [19] . However, both of the above techniques do not provide any method to detect conflicts in a TFP.
The above-discussed techniques provide different approaches to manage firewall policies, but none of the above techniques can deal with time-based firewall policies. In this paper, we have solved the conflict detection problem in time-based filters, which had not been addressed in any of the related works discussed above.
Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we have formalized the conflict detection problem and designed a TFP similar to the Linux iptables, CISCO ACLs, and so on. We have described the implementation of the proposed system in detail and presented new functions and algorithms to deal with the time-based filters. We have proved in the experimental analysis that the workload of the administrator is considerably reduced because the effort towards reconfiguration of policies in order to discard conflicts is reduced. Our future research plan focuses on improving the system further to manage periodic filters and to detect conflicts caused by a combination of filters.
